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INTRODUCTION
In Buying a Bride, Marcia Zug explores the history and law of
“mail-order brides,” which has been a feature of the American
experience since its inception. This little-understood phenomenon is
often conflated with, and reviled as, human trafficking. Zug is, however,
a staunch defender. Although clear-eyed about its exploitative potential,
she argues that it has often been a means for women to increase their
financial, social, and legal autonomy.
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Feminist legal scholars will find this book important because Zug
shows how mail-order marriage led directly to the adoption of laws
giving women independent economic rights and the western states
granting female suffrage before the East followed suit. It is also
significant for critical race scholars because Zug chronicles the crucial
way that anxieties about race, ethnic purity, and immigration affected
the dominant attitude towards the practice from the colonial era until
today.
Zug’s title intentionally reflects the offensive terminology of critics.
“[R]ather than shying away from the association with female
commodification, I decided to confront it . . . . By referring to the
women in this book as ‘mail-order brides,’ I signal my intention to
address these criticisms and explicitly challenge the assumption that
such women are exploited.” 1
She discusses several institutions that seem facially quite diverse.
What she believes they have in common is that they all involve “a
marriage resulting from some form of advertisement or other public
request, soliciting women to enter into a marriage with a previously
unknown man and typically travel a significant distance to complete this
union.” 2
Zug has a number of responses to those who condemn mail-order
marriages. First, they conflate different things. Yes, historically, some
European women were kidnapped and forcibly transported to American
colonies, and yes, today, human trafficking is a real crime sometimes
fostered by fraudulent advertisements over the Internet. However, Zug
argues that these are distinct from the practices she discusses.
Second, those who argue that mail-order marriages encourage the
commodification of women expressly or implicitly assume an idealized
norm of marriage as a romantic union between equals having the goal of
personal self-fulfillment. Zug, in contrast, emphasizes that marriage has
traditionally been, first and foremost, an economic relationship with the
interconnected goals of establishing a household and carrying on the
family line. Although we moderns may try to repress this inconvenient
fact, our foremothers and many of our contemporary foreign sisters,
could not and cannot afford to be so squeamish.
Third and most importantly, critics view mail-order marriages
from an ahistorical and culturally myopic perspective. Traditionally,
women had relatively little choice in their career and marriage
prospects—partners being imposed by family, custom, and lack of
alternatives. Women, both in the past and in many countries now, enter
into mail-order marriages in large part to escape these strictures. That is,
1 MARCIA A. ZUG, BUYING A BRIDE: AN ENGAGING HISTORY OF MAIL-ORDER MATCHES 7
(2016).
2 Id. at 7–8.
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mail-order marriage can increase feminine agency.
I would go further. It is not so much that mail-order marriages
commodify women. Rather, history, anthropology, and psychoanalytical
theory suggest that woman is the ur-commodity. Historically, societies
structure themselves, and the masculine subject creates himself, through
the possession and exchange of women by men (albeit, often aided and
abetted by women who accept the status quo). Through mail-order
marriages, individual women seek to interfere with this dynamic by
becoming active participants in the bargaining process. Tellingly,
according to Zug, American public opinion only turned against mailorder marriage in the late nineteenth century when the development of
mass-circulation publication and personal ads enabled women to not
merely accept solicitations but to actively solicit partners themselves.
This was the tipping point of too much female agency.
Neither Zug, nor I, should be misunderstood as ignoring the
problems of mail-order marriage let alone arguing that it is superior to
other historical or contemporary ways of finding spouses and
establishing households. For myself, I am in a companionable lovebased marriage consistent with the modern romantic ideal and would
not have considered a mail-order marriage when I was single. But this is
because we both are highly educated white women, reared in middleclass families in late twentieth-century America, who had other
economic opportunities than marriage. Zug reminds us that women like
us are the empirical exceptions to the predominant rule.
Consequently, Zug admirably does not deny but confronts the
traditional subordination of women. What she does do is interfere with
a common (but far from universal) feminist narrative of woman as
passive victim.
I. COLONIAL HISTORY
Zug starts with the British settlement of Jamestown in the early
seventeenth century. Unlike the religiously inspired northern colonists
who arrived in family groups, the southern colonies tended to attract
single males, many of whom expected to stay for a short time and return
home. 3 Consequently, the government sought to import British women
to encourage more permanent settlements.
Here, Zug upbraids Marilyn French for claiming that colonial
Virginia was populated through the kidnapping, terrorism, and rape of
English women. 4 Zug acknowledges that early attempts to pay recruiters
to find settlers led to abductions—of both men and women. Zug argues
3
4

Id. at 12.
Id. at 29.
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that this was quickly discontinued as a failed experiment to be replaced
by other recruitment techniques. Consequently, “French’s inaccurate
description confuses instances in which Englishwomen were kidnapped
with the willing immigration of the Jamestown brides” and “refuses to
acknowledge the possibility that the women came willingly or that
becoming a mail-order bride could be a rational or even wise decision.” 5
The Virginia Company offered financial incentives to women to
move to Virginia. “Tobacco wives” were offered passage, clothing, food,
supply, and shelter. 6 But, more importantly for Zug’s story, the women
who immigrated were given economic opportunities that were not
available in Great Britain. They were granted greater property and
inheritance rights than they would have in England where a femme
couvert lost control of her property and right to contract upon marriage.
In some cases female colonists were granted land by the state and were
paid comparable wages to men. 7 Most female colonists were from
“modest backgrounds” who would most likely have had to go into
service at home and postpone marriage for many years while they
worked to earn funds to support a household. 8 In other words, these
women, like male colonists, were making rational decisions given their
economic and legal opportunities. Were the opportunities available in
Virginia great? Probably no. Were they better than those available in
Britain? Probably yes.
Although Zug describes this as the first example of mail-order
wives, significantly, women who accepted the offer to immigrate were
not required to marry at all, let alone marry any specific man. That is,
they received the financial incentives regardless of their eventual marital
status. Just having a (white) feminine presence in Virginia was
considered positive. And, indeed, some female immigrants chose not to
marry. If a woman did wish to marry, she had considerable choice of
partners, as men continued to substantially outnumber women. Zug’s
analysis of the case law for breach of promise—the cause of action
“when one party breaks off an engagement and the jilted party believes
that he or she has been unfairly treated and harmed by the loss of the
intended marriage” 9—is telling. In England they were almost always
brought by women against men. “[I]n the Virginia colony, this situation
was reversed.” 10
Zug illustrates her point by contrasting the two radically different
experiences France had in introducing Frenchwomen to its two western
5
6
7
8
9
10

Id.
Id. at 21.
See id. at 23–24.
Id. at 22–23.
Id. at 26.
Id.
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colonies—New France (i.e., Canada) and Louisiana. In Canada, in order
to counter the sexual imbalance of colonists, the government created the
institution of les filles du roi (“the king’s daughters”). Frenchwomen
were offered financial incentives, including substantial dowries.
Although initially targeted to rural women who presumably would be
more willing to face the hardships of colonial life, surprisingly,
applicants came from cities as well as villages, and from all classes,
including the nobility. 11 As an indication of the bargaining power these
women had, although under French law a wife would ordinarily lose
control of her dowry (in this case supplied by the State) upon marriage,
in Canada “more than 82 percent of the women signed marital contracts
ensuring they retained at least some of their separate property after
marriage.” 12
The king’s daughters came to Canada, not because they were
looking for love, but for practical economic reasons. “Nevertheless,
because the filles du roi had the opportunity to get to know their
potential husbands [i.e., as opposed to at home in France where families
typically arranged marriages], they actually had a greater chance of
marrying for love than did most seventeenth-century Frenchwomen.” 13
The success of the king’s daughters must be contrasted to the
woeful French experience in Louisiana. An early program similar to the
king’s daughters proved unsuccessful because recruiters blatantly lied
about the conditions of the Southern colonies. 14 Reportedly, the women
were also treated abysmally, often raped in transit, and as a result,
refused to marry and ended up “living in misery.” 15 Word of the truth
leaked back to France, dooming the effort.
France responded in the worst possible way—transporting female
prisoners to Louisiana. 16 In Zug’s words:
The compulsory immigration of Frenchwomen was unconscionable,
but what happened to many of the women before they departed for
Louisiana is equally horrific. Some were forcibly married to male
prisoners bound for the colony, while others were chained and
marched across France as a warning to other potential criminals.
Hundreds died on these treks. In 1719, 150 female prisoners rioted to
avoid the march and forced immigration to Louisiana. Six of them
were shot, a dozen more were wounded, and the rest spent the winter
starving, ill clothed, and housed in freezing conditions. In the spring,
the survivors were shipped to the colony. In total, approximately
7,000 women were deported to the colony, but most never made it.
11
12
13
14
15
16

Id. at 37–38.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 55.
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The majority died on the forced marches and perilous sea voyage.
Only 1,300 actually arrived in the colony, of whom only 178
remained alive in 1721. 17

This gynocide overtakes even the horrors that Marilyn French invokes.
Nevertheless, Zug argues that we must distinguish the Louisiana
experience of exploitation and kidnapping of female prisoners from
voluntary mail-order marriage in New France and America. 18
II. THE WESTERN EXPANSION
Zug tells a parallel story about the settlement of the American West
in the nineteenth century. The California gold rush of 1849 led to a
highly skewed sex ratio (even after including indigenous women). There
were numerous recruitment movements to persuade women to relocate
from eastern cities and mill towns that suffered from a deficit of both
eligible single men and jobs. The successful ones emphasized
employment opportunities, subsidized transportation costs, and
promised greater social equality.
Most interestingly from a legal perspective, in order to encourage
female migration, western states adopted progressive legislation giving
married women “control over their separate property” 19 and liberalizing
divorce law. 20 The federal government adopted the Donation Land Act
covering the Oregon Territory that not only allowed married couples to
“claim twice the land available to single men,” 21 but also “dispensed with
the normal rules of coverture and guaranteed that half the claimed land
would become the separate estate of the wife.” 22 The Homestead Act
went further, allowing single women to claim land in their own right
(although few other than engaged women and families with unmarried
daughters were in a position to do so). 23 A generation later, western
states, starting with Wyoming in 1869, granted female suffrage as a way
of encouraging female immigration. “By 1915, women had suffrage in
every western state save Texas and New Mexico. In contrast, not a single
eastern state had granted the right to women.” 24
Once again, although Zug refers to this as “mail-order marriage,”
17 Id. at 57 (footnotes omitted). Opera lovers will remember the last scene of Puccini’s
Manon Lescaut in which the titular anti-heroine, transported with other courtesans to
Louisiana, expires in the desert outside of New Orleans.
18 Id. at 61.
19 Id. at 80.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 85.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 86.
24 Id. at 141.
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and the potential for marriage was advertised as one attraction for
female immigrants, women were not required to marry. In fact, women
who moved west generally did not marry quickly and sometimes not at
all because of the availability of other economic alternatives. As Zug
states concerning the “Mercer girls” who settled in the Oregon
Territory, they “left their homes and families and traveled thousands of
miles in order to gain greater command and independence over their
economic, social, and political destinies.” 25 Zug emphasizes that they did
not find—or expect—perfection. But, like all entrepreneurs (and male
settlers), they took a calculated risk in an attempt to improve their
position.
III. CHANGING TIMES
The public attitude towards mail-order marriages changed when
the custom evolved from generalized solicitation of women to address
sex-ratio imbalances, to individualized solicitation.
Once western states achieved their demographic objectives they had
little interest in continuing to promote mail-order marriage and
quickly stopped extolling its benefits and began emphasizing its
dangers. Meanwhile, eastern support for mail-order marriages had
always been tenuous, and without the West’s population concerns,
these states saw little reason to promote mail-order marriages. 26

In the meantime, other social changes were occurring. During the
Civil War, women were encouraged to correspond with soldiers,
including those they did not know, as a patriotic duty. 27 This was
abetted by new “modern” media, i.e., newspapers and personal ads.
Individual soldiers took out ads looking for pen pals, often holding out
the possibility of marriage after the war. 28
The war’s carnage created a demographic imbalance in the eastern
United States, the opposite of that which had led to the earlier mailorder marriage, i.e., a surfeit of single women. Moreover, once the
genies of correspondence between unrelated women and men, and
personal ads were out of the bottle, they could not be put back in.
Nevertheless, marital advertisement outside of the military context,
although common, was never completely socially acceptable because it
enabled women to take control of their own courtship away from their
families. Consequently, although the press was happy to collect the
revenues from the ads, it tended to run articles emphasizing the dangers
25
26
27
28

Id. at 93.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 135.
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of fraudulent marriage offers. 29
This new practice led to a number of pro-female legal changes. The
tort of seduction was expanded so that the woman, and not her father,
could be a plaintiff. 30 The remedies for breach of promise were
expanded to include punitive and exemplary damages. 31 Common law
marriages were now recognized and protected in most states. 32
IV. RACE AND XENOPHOBIA
Zug’s story is an American one and, as such, it is as much about
race as sex. Her relatively sunny account of mail-order marriage is
overshadowed by the fact that it was often driven by racial and ethnic
hatred.
White male settlers in both Jamestown and New France initially
married indigenous women. Indeed, the French encouraged this on the
theory that it would lead to the assimilation of Indians to European
ways. 33 But the opposite was the case.
Pocahontas, who converted to Christianity and moved to England
with her husband John Rolfe, was the exception. The norm was that
white men who married Indians tended to abandon the colonies and
join their wives’ people. 34 This was not only religiously offensive to the
colonial authorities, it threatened to undermine the success of the
enterprise and lead to the “adulteration” of the “whiteness and purity of
the children.” 35 In addition, once the French and the English began
allying with different Indian ethnic groups, intermarriage could be a
security risk. 36 Consequently, the attempts to recruit European women
to the “New World” was to a large part driven by the fear that
intermarriage was leading to what the French called the
“ensauvagement” of the Europeans. 37
Zug’s account of the western movement of Caucasian women in
Id. at 127–28, 147–49.
Id. at 151–52.
31 Id. at 152.
32 Id. at 152–53.
33 Indian women were often eager to marry Europeans, especially in Canada. There was a
sexual imbalance resulting in a paucity of native grooms. But more importantly, Indian wives
could serve as translators and cultural liaisons “enabl[ing] them to boost their prestige and
authority within the tribe.” Id. at 32.
34 As David Brooks notes, even in the eighteenth century, “[a]s time went by, the settlers
from Europe noticed something: No Indians were defecting to join colonial society, but many
whites were defecting to live in the Native American one.” David Brooks, The Great Affluence
Fallacy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/09/opinion/the-greataffluence-fallacy.html?_r=0.
35 ZUG, supra note 1, at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36 Id. at 32–33.
37 Id. at 31.
29
30
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the nineteenth century reveals a similar racial animosity. Initially, some
white male settlers cohabited with Indian women (although this practice
was not encouraged as it was in the early colonies). 38 When the
significant numbers of white women did immigrate, however, courts
started refusing to recognize these common law marriages, disinheriting
Indian women and mixed-race children. “[T]he Oregon territorial
government passed a law voiding solemnized marriages between whites
and all other racial groups . . . .” 39
Nevertheless, mail-order marriage did allow African American
women as well as Caucasians to improve their economic and legal
status, allowing them “to escape the South and its crushing racial
restrictions” by moving west. 40 For example, the “Busy Bee Club, a
group, founded in 1885 by six African American women, seeking to
increase female immigration . . . . placed matrimonial advertisements in
numerous eastern papers and then supplied interested women with oneway tickets paid for by [Tucson’s] bachelors.” 41
If racism encouraged official support for mail-order marriage in
early American history, it was also a factor in the increasingly negative
view among the white majority population starting in the second half of
the nineteenth century. Alarm over the influx of laborers led first to the
de facto prohibition of Chinese women as presumptive prostitutes and
then the outright ban of all Chinese immigration under the Chinese
Exclusion Act. 42 Although initially other Asians could enter the United
States, after the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1905, the only Japanese who
were eligible to enter the country were the wives and children of
Japanese men who were already here. As anti-miscegenation laws
prohibited them from marrying non-Asian women, Asian American
men sought to bring Asian women into the country. 43 This led to the
practice of “picture brides,” i.e., the solicitation of potential wives from
Japan, Okinawa, and Korea through photos and letters. 44
Unlike the white “mail-order brides” in Virginia, New France, and
the American West, these women had no choice but to marry specific
men. Picture brides could not immigrate unless they were already
married to their suitors. Consequently, they married men they never
met by proxy. If a picture bride changed her mind upon meeting her
husband, she risked being deported back home to the very situation she

38 In addition, sexual violence by white settlers against the native population was rife. Id. at
66–68.
39 Id. at 86.
40 Id. at 141.
41 Id. at 142.
42 Id. at 158.
43 Id. at 159–60.
44 Id. at 160–64.
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was desperate to escape. 45
As the accounts of many picture brides indicate, then as now with
dating websites, prospective grooms often engaged in fraudulent
inducements, sending old photographs and exaggerating or lying about
their professions and wealth. 46 Nevertheless, Zug defends the practice as
autonomy-enhancing, given the alternatives. Most of these women were
making conscious, if perhaps poorly informed, decisions to leave
grinding poverty, toil, and the prospect of arranged marriages. Despite
their often unhappy marriages, many women made the most of the
greater economic opportunities and political freedom available in the
United States, becoming successful businesswomen and community
leaders. Their financial success enabled them—once they were
established as permanent residents—to divorce at rates higher than
native-born American women. 47
Japanese immigration was ended in 1924, but hostility towards
mail-order marriage was driven by more generalized xenophobia.
Immigration from Europe became more restricted, and it became
increasingly hard for even highly skilled single women to convince the
immigration authorities that they were not either prostitutes or
undesirables “likely to become a public charge” or “LPC.” 48 However,
the Quota Act, which severely restricted immigration from eastern and
southern Europe, did not apply to wives. Like Asian women before
them, European woman turned to mail-order marriages as a means of
achieving their goal of immigration. 49
Unfortunately, early feminism was another source of antiimmigration attitudes, generally, and mail-order marriages, specifically.
Women’s rights advocates worried that foreign-born women were more
traditional than Americans and would not support progressive profemale legislation. 50 Early feminists also argued that mail-order
marriages were “death sentences to individuality and progress” because
these women “submissively accept[ed] unknown husbands without
friendship, romance, love, or any of those backgrounds which we have
grown to regard as essential to marriage.” 51 Zug thinks that this, once
again, ignores that these women were asserting their agency in choosing
economic and marital prospects that they believed were superior to
those available at home.

Id. at 164–65.
Id. at 165–66.
47 Id. at 166–68.
48 Id. at 171.
49 Id. at 174–80.
50 In contrast, native-born American women lost their citizenship and suffrage (in those
states where women could vote) if they married a non-citizen. Id. at 181–82.
51 Id. at 183 (internal quotation marks omitted).
45
46
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V. MODERN TIMES
The most controversial section of Zug’s book concerns her analysis
of contemporary practices. Mail-order marriage “virtually disappeared
in the 1950’s” 52 as “the idea of marriage as an equal partnership” became
the norm. 53 Nevertheless, it has recently made a comeback. “There are
currently more than four hundred international marriage broker
agencies,” most of which employ websites that women can use for free,
but men are charged “substantial fees.” 54
The standard view of these websites is negative. Some feminists
consider mail-order marriages to be a form of trafficking by definition.55
Others argue that the women who enter into these are subject to
domestic abuse. 56 The popular press presents the common stereotype
that men who seek them are losers who reject modern marriage of
equals and seek to control docile, traditional women. 57
One final objection to mail-order marriage is the belief that it
commodifies something that should not be commodified and therefore
exploits women. As marriage historian Nancy Cott has written,
“American rhetoric and popular culture . . . put love and money on
opposite sides of the street. Mercenary or cold-blooded motives for
marrying [are] labeled crass, unethical, and destined for disastrous
fate.” 58
Zug argues that things are much more complicated. First, she
disposes of the trafficking accusation by arguing that this expansive
definition lumps “legitimate” websites with abusive ones. She also
argues that those who argue that mail-order brides are often abused
make questionable use of statistics. The best argument is that there is
some evidence that immigrant women are abused at a higher rate than
native-born Americans. However, there is no evidence that mail-order
brides are disproportionately abused when compared to other
immigrants. Indeed, there is some evidence to the contrary. 59 Zug
suggests that since, by definition, mail-order brides have immigrated
lawfully, they have more opportunity to leave their husbands, report
abuse, and seek legal protection than undocumented immigrants who
might feel trapped in an abusive relationship. 60
Second, she argues that the ideal that romantic love should be a
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id. at 188.
Id.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 198–99.
Id. at 191–93.
Id. at 190–91.
Id. at 215 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 194–95.
Id. at 193–96.
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necessary consideration in choosing marriage partners is extremely
recent. “[I]t was not until the late twentieth century that a majority of
American women finally indicated that love outweighed all other
considerations in choosing a partner.” 61 And the American obsession
with romance in marriage may partially account for the high divorce
rate in contemporary times.
Third, Zug discusses studies that suggest that neither the American
men nor the foreign women in these relations easily conform to the
stereotype of domineering misogynist chauvinists and passive women.
Although the men surveyed do tend to say that they are seeking more
“traditional” women who will accept “the male protector/provider
role,” 62 they also accept the fact that their wives will want to work
outside the house. These men tend to feel “disempowered in relation to
elites” and “[c]onsequently, for many of these struggling men, the
appeal of a mail-order marriage is not that it introduces them to women
they can dominate, but that it connects them with sympathetic partners
who have experienced similar struggles.” 63 In addition, because
American women still tend to either marry economic equals or marry
up despite their increased economic and educational achievements,
there is a shortage of single women willing to marry men without
college education, particularly in the African American community. 64 In
contrast, highly educated women in some countries believe that they are
disadvantaged in the local marriage market because of traditional
values. Marriage broker websites can, therefore, address these
demographic mismatches.
Most radically, Zug invokes the work of Professor Robin West who
argues that it is the romantic concept of marriage that “encourages
women to provide their services for free and devalues women and the
work they do . . . .”65 In West’s analysis, women are encouraged to think
of the good of others and not their own maximization and thereby lose
“the sense of integrity necessary to at least liberal conceptions of
individualism.” 66 Zug suggests that, based on this analysis, a mail-order
bride may be better off than a woman marrying in the hope of being
loved. “A mail-order bride who makes her sacrifices and performs
caregiving for her husband and family as part of a contractual
understanding is empowered by her actions in a way the ‘loving’
altruistic wife is not.” 67
Finally, to tie this last chapter to her earlier ones, Zug implicitly
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id. at 216.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 200–04, 211.
Id. at 174–80.
Id. at 217.
ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 121 (1999).
ZUG, supra note 1, at 218.
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accuses critics of modern mail-order marriages of cultural blindness.
Mail-order marriages may not look like a partnership of equals to
American academics. However, the brides surveyed believe that their
grooms’ attitudes are more egalitarian than those of their countrymen.
In other words, Zug is arguing, once again, that these women are
making a rational choice to expand their agency based on the
opportunities they believe are otherwise available to them. 68
To drive home this point, in her conclusion, Zug introduces us
briefly to one of the unexpected consequences of marriage equality—the
development of all-male mail-order marriage websites. Regrettably,
there are many countries where homosexuality is illegal or, at least,
dangerous. Consequently, some gay foreign men—like women before
them—see marriage to a stranger not as a romantic panacea, but as a
practical alternative.
VI. POST-MODERNISM
This is not a theoretical book, but it raises theoretical questions.
Zug is well aware that her relatively positive account of mail-order
marriage may be offensive to some American feminists concerned about
the commodification of women. But Zug critiques this position as
implicitly assuming that women start from the position of freedom and
are then subordinated.
This assumption is problematic for two reasons. First, as Zug
argues, it is incorrect as a historical and anthropological fact. Second, as
I shall argue, it implicitly adopts the classical liberal proposition that the
subject begins as the free individual within the state of nature who is
then oppressed by society.
Zug’s analysis arguably fits better into Continental or speculative
political theory than within the classical liberal paradigm that dominates
American thinking. Liberalism takes individuation and freedom as
givens. This means that society is a constraint and, therefore, a problem
to be explained and justified. Speculative theory, in contrast, seeks to
understand how individuation and freedom can be created within and
through society. Liberalism’s hypothetical state of nature is not, in fact,
natural let alone empirical. It is a logical construct or thought
experiment. Freedom can only become concrete and positive within
society.
Of course, the speculative position is not the silly one that all
societies are free. As I shall discuss, historically, most human beings
have been constrained by society. From a Hegelian perspective, Western
society only developed to a stage where freedom was beginning to
68

Id. at 221–23.
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become actualized in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
when modern property and contract relations and constitutional
representative government were replacing feudalism. Moreover, from
the position of structuralist anthropology and Lacanian psychoanalysis,
women are the primal commodity.
The question from the speculative feminist position is, therefore,
not how does society commodify women. It is how do women create a
society in which we can decommodifiy ourselves. Zug argues that,
ironically, mail-order marriages enable women to achieve some degree
of agency, individuation, and practical freedom by taking an active role
in controlling their pre-existing commodification.
VII. HISTORY AND ANTHROPOLOGY
Zug emphasizes that the decisions women make in accepting mailorder marriage invitations must be examined in the context of the
alternatives available in their time and culture. A related point is made
by legal historian Mark Weiner in a somewhat different context.
In The Rule of the Clan, 69 Weiner defends the modern liberal state
from attacks from libertarianism, which assumes that freedom and
rights pre-exist law. He argues that the State does not merely protect the
liberal70 ideals of individual rights and equality, it creates them.
Weiner rejects one of liberalism’s founding presuppositions: the
free individual in the state of nature as a historic fact. Wiener’s
examination of traditional societies across history show that they share a
single broad organizational structure that belies their facial diversity. He
defines the “clan” as “legal structures and cultural values of societies
organized primarily on the basis of kinship . . . .” 71 “[C]ompared with
modern liberal states, communities governed by the rule of the clan
possess a markedly diminished conception of individual
freedom . . . . because under their legal principles people are valued less
as individuals per se than as members of their extended families.” 72
“Natural” man is not free. Moreover, history shows that when
states fail, society quickly devolves back into clan-like organization. 73 If
we were to fail to “maintain and nurture robust state institutions
69 MARK WEINER, THE RULE OF THE CLAN: WHAT AN ANCIENT FORM OF SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION REVEALS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (2013).
70 He uses the term “liberal” to “refer to people committed to the values of individualism
and the principles of liberal democratic government, regardless of party affiliation.” Id. at 8.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 9.
73 In his words, “[t]he clan is a natural form of social and legal organization—it is far more
explicable in human terms than the modern liberal state—and people quickly, reflexively turn
to it in the want of an alternative.” Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
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dedicated to the public interest, ignoring our human impulse to create
clanlike forms of legal organization, it [would] spell the end of
individualism as we know it.” 74
Similarly, the great liberal principle embodied in the Declaration of
Independence “that all men are created equal” is a counter-factual: as an
empirical matter, different people have different capabilities.
Nevertheless, for the liberal constitutional state to function, we must act
and treat other people as though we were equal. 75 In other words,
equality is a legal status, not a natural condition, and as such functions
only insofar as we make an ethical commitment to it.
Within the clan, man—and even more strikingly, woman—is
neither free nor an individual. She is subordinate to her function within
the group—in the case of woman, reproduction and the embodiment of
honor. 76 In the clan, there are no individual rights protected by law, only
the honor of the family avenged by feud. 77 A woman has no
individualism because her body is the receptacle of the family’s lineage
and honor. 78 As Zug emphasizes, in traditional societies, women’s
marital choices tend to be extremely restricted, which is why mail-order
marriages can be seen as freedom-enhancing.
Weiner’s analysis brings to mind Claude Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist
analysis of kinship systems set forth most succinctly in The Elementary
Structures of Kinship. Lévi-Strauss emphasizes two important things:
The first is that kinship systems structure how goods, ideas, and people
are “exchanged” within a culture. The second is that kinship systems
comprise “the exchange of women,” wherein family groups “give”
women to another family to be a wife, and receive in exchange
something of value (a dowry, for example). In other words, women are
the proto-commodity. 79
Adopting the terminology of “[t]he founding father of legal history
74
75

Id. at 16.
As I have stated elsewhere:

A[n] . . . empirical study resulted in the initially surprising suggestion that people
who live in developed market economies are significantly more altruistic, generous
and trusting than people who live in traditional cultures. Economist Samuel Bowles
offers a possible explanation for this finding that is similar to my thesis: “Markets
teach us to behave decently to strangers . . . . Markets are an arena in which you
encounter somebody you’ve never seen before and engage in mutually beneficial
activity.”
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Economic Rationality, Empathy, and Corporate Responsibility, 70 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 875, 883 (2002) [hereinafter Schroeder, Economic Rationality] (footnotes
omitted).
76 WEINER, supra note 69, at 12.
77 Id. at 18, 101.
78 See id. at 113–14.
79 CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP 478–82 (Rodney
Needham ed., James Harle Bell & John Richard von Sturmer trans., 1969).
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and legal anthropology, Henry Sumner Maine,” Weiner argues that
individual rights only come into being with the development of the state
when contract supersedes status—the relations that characterize the
clan. 80 Contract presumes formal equality and reciprocity that respects
the independence of both parties. This is why contract is the dominant
economic relation in liberal states founded on legal equality. I will
return to this.
In contrast, the dominant exchange relation in pre-modern clan
societies is gift. Gift might at first blush seem benevolent—indeed
reflecting a feminine ethic of care—in our society in which it is the
exception to the norm of contract. However, in traditional societies gift
is a way for one man to assert dominance over another. Gift is
unilateral. In gift societies, not only must the donee accept the gift, he is
required to reciprocate with an equivalent or greater gift or suffer shame
and ostracism. 81 Consequently, gift is a form of forced exchange and,
therefore, aggressive. Perhaps the most extreme example of this
dynamic was the practice of potlatch or gift as a form of war through
which a great man would seek to impoverish his rival through everincreasing rounds of forced “generosity.” 82 The anti-feminist aspect of
gift-exchange clan societies becomes more apparent when one
contemplates Lévi-Strauss’s point that the “gift” is often a woman. 83
The majority of Zug’s mail-order brides come from societies that
are not fully modern in Maine’s contractual sense. Colonists in the
seventeenth century and picture wives in the nineteenth were fleeing
cultures still dominated by class and characterized by arranged
marriages. Although arguably men in nineteenth-century America lived
in a society dominated by contract, women’s rights to enter into
contracts and own property were still limited. Consequently, because
western jurisdictions granted women more economic equal rights, the
decision to go from east to west was also a movement from status to
contract.
WEINER, supra note 69, at 10.
MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC
SOCIETIES 3 (W.D. Halls trans., 1990); see also JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF
VENUS: THE EROTICS OF THE MARKET 18–29, 63 (2004) [hereinafter SCHROEDER, VENUS]; 1
GEORGES BATAILLE, THE ACCURSED SHARE: AN ESSAY ON GENERAL ECONOMY 70–71 (Robert
Hurley trans., 1988).
82 CYRIL S. BELSHAW, TRADITIONAL EXCHANGE AND MODERN MARKETS 22–26 (1965);
MAUSS, supra note 81, at 37.
83 Although this is beyond the scope of this Essay, psychoanalytic theory posits that, even
today, “masculine” personality is created through the hypothetical possession and exchange of
an object of desire, associated with the feminine, by a community of masculine subjects.
“Feminine” personality, in contrast, reflects an identification with the object of desire being
exchanged. This difference between having (masculine) and being (feminine) is reflected in the
verb forms of European (and perhaps other) languages. See JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL
AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY, AND THE FEMININE (1998) [hereinafter
SCHROEDER, VESTAL] (explaining this dynamic); SCHROEDER, VENUS, supra note 81 (same).
80
81
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Although the story is not simple with respect to contemporary
mail-order marriages, the brides tend to live in either more “traditional”
societies where women’s roles are constrained, or in countries that have
only relatively recently rejected Communism but have not adopted a
liberal political system. In these cases, the women perceive that they do
not have the same marital and economic choices available in America.
Consequently, it is not just that women achieve greater agency by
being able to have a greater input into this process. The very fact that the
commodification of women in marriage is made more express and more
contract-like may itself be a step forward, as Zug suggests. Indeed, from
a Hegelian perspective, it is not surprising that states and territories that
encouraged mail-order marriage also granted women greater contract
and property rights and even suffrage. That is, they recognized women
as, if not quite equal subjects with men, nevertheless more subject-like.
VIII. FROM STATUS TO CONTRACT
As suggested, the Zug-Weiner analysis is arguably more consistent
with the speculative tradition of Continental theory generally, and
Hegelian political philosophy specifically, than with classical liberalism.
To reiterate, in classical liberalism the free individual is deemed natural
so the state is seen as the problem to be explained. In speculative theory,
the question is how to create individualism and freedom. As an
empirical matter, we are born as helpless infants within families, learn a
collective language, become subject to laws, etc., and nevertheless
experience ourselves as being unique. Speculative theory seeks to
understand these phenomena. Individuality is an artifice: a human
creation and a hard-won achievement. 84 The individual and the private
law regime of rights are mutually constituting, each giving birth to the
other. 85
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right 86 is, in the words of my colleague
Arthur Jacobson, a Bildungsroman of personality. 87 It follows the logical
development of the person from the simplest conception through the
empirical citizen located in the modern constitutional state in the order
of right he calls Sittlicheit—usually translated into English as “ethical
life.” I have discussed Hegel’s argument extensively elsewhere 88 and will
BRUCE FINK, THE LACANIAN SUBJECT: BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND JOUISSANCE 24 (1995).
ALAN BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW: STUDIES IN HEGELIAN
JURISPRUDENCE 17 (1995).
86 G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Allen W. Wood ed., HB.
Nisbet trans., 1991) [hereinafter HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT].
87 Arthur Jacobson, Hegel’s Legal Plenum, in HEGEL AND LEGAL THEORY 97, 115 (Drucilla
Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld & David Gray Carlson eds., 1991).
88 I do this most thoroughly in SCHROEDER, VENUS, supra note 81 and SCHROEDER,
84
85
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only make a few points before moving on to the aspect of the theory that
I believe is relevant to Zug’s story.
The first is that Hegel does not reject the classical liberal notion of
the autonomous individual in the state of nature as a theoretical model,
as opposed to a historic or empirical fact. Indeed, he begins his
Philosophy of Right by accepting a radical version of liberalism, that
espoused by Immanuel Kant. 89 Hegel argues not that Kant is wrong, but
that his theory is inadequate because it is logically incomplete as well as
empirically inaccurate. The freedom that is the autonomous individual’s
essence cannot be actualized in the state of nature because it is abstract
and negative. 90
To put this more strongly, to call the free person in the state of
nature is a misnomer. He, or more accurately, it, is free because it is
radically abstract, having no concrete characteristics that could limit it.
This means that each abstract person is indistinguishable from each
other. Abstract right is the most “primitive” means by which the liberal
person can take on individuating characteristics that will enable it (now,
he or she) to be recognized as a unique individual. 91
For reasons that are beyond our present scope, Hegel believes that
the abstract person can become concrete and freedom-positive only
through relationships with others. The logically first and most
“primitive” stage in this story is the creation of what I am calling the
“subject”—the aspect of personality that is capable of bearing legal rights
and duties—but which can also be thought of as an individual. This is
achieved through what he calls “abstract right,” i.e., private property and
contract. Specifically, the abstract person creates concrete individuality
(i.e., differentiation and individuation) through a regime of possession,
enjoyment, and alienation of objects of desire. 92
Hegel argues that contract is necessary for the creation of
subjectivity, equality, and concrete freedom because it is bilateral. That
is, although contract is limiting in that it binds the parties to obligations,
it is not imposed by one party over the other, as it is in gift. 93 Not only
must each party bind herself (at least as a formal manner), she must
respect the will of the counterparty to choose whether or not to bind
himself.
Second, it is crucial that the subject is not the historic first stage in
the development of personality. Rather it was historically the last—the
VESTAL, supra note 83.
89 SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 83, at 29.
90 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 86, at 46–49; BRUDNER, supra note 85, at 21,
36; SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 83, at 32–33.
91 SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 83, at 33–34; Alan Brudner, The Unity of Property Law,
4 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 3, 19 (1991).
92 His analysis is set forth in HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 86, at 73–103.
93 SCHROEDER, VENUS, supra note 81, at 53–54; see supra text accompanying notes 81–82.
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constitutional state in which the citizen is located could not come into
being until the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century as its
condition precedent. Or, more accurately, abstract right and the subject
are born together. As we have discussed, historically, human societies
have been characterized by status, not abstract right (contract).
On the one hand, despite the fact that Hegel insists on the necessity
of private property and contract, he is not a libertarian. The state and
laws are necessary for the creation of positive freedom. Just as Kant’s
notion of the autonomous individual in the state of nature proved to be
a partial and inadequate account of personhood that had to be
supplemented by the subject in abstract right, so will the subject and
abstract right prove to be partial and inadequate. They will be
supplemented by more complex and more adequate aspects of
personhood created in the realms of morality and ethical life.
On the other hand, despite the fact that Hegel insists that abstract
right contains internal contradictions and must go under, neither is he a
simplistic socialist. In contrast to Karl Marx who was deeply influenced
by Hegel’s method and thought that capitalism was a necessary stage in
the development of personality, Hegel argued that it was logically
necessary for some regime of private property and contract to persist
after the development of “higher” levels of societal development.
Hegel’s (and Marx’s) logic is sometimes described by critics as an
initial thesis, contradicted by its antithesis, resulting in a synthesis. In
fact, he does not use this crude terminology which suggests that the
contradictions within earlier stages in the logic will be eliminated or
suppressed by later ones. 94 Rather, he uses the terms understanding,
dialectic, and speculative reasoning (the last often translated as the
obscure English word borrowed from chemistry, “sublation”).
An understanding is a statement of a proposition. 95 The dialectic,
as the etymology reveals, is a second reading that points out the internal
contradictions that any positive statement inevitably leaves out. 96
Speculative reasoning proposes a third interpretation that shows how
the understanding and the dialectic are simultaneously both false (in the
sense of inadequate) yet contain a moment of truth. 97 Any resolution
produced by speculative reasoning is, however, merely temporary. The
94 Allen Wood states that, to his knowledge, this terminology is “never used by Hegel, not
even once . . . . The use of [this] terminology to expound the Hegelian dialectic is nearly always
an unwitting confession that the expositor has little or no firsthand knowledge of Hegel.”
ALLEN W. WOOD, HEGEL’S ETHICAL THOUGHT 3–4 (1990). Michael Inwood suggests, however,
that Hegel does endorse this terminology (which had been used by Fichte and Schelling) in his
Lectures on the History of Philosophy. MICHAEL INWOOD, HEGEL 550 n.100 (1983).
95 DAVID GRAY CARLSON, A COMMENTARY TO HEGEL’S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 19–21 (2007).
96 Id. at 21.
97 JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE FOUR LACANIAN DISCOURSES OR TURNING LAW
INSIDE-OUT 125 (2008).
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speculative resolution proves to be a new understanding to be
contradicted by a new dialectic, etc. 98 In other words, although any
specific contradiction is unstable and must go under, “contradiction”
per se can never be eliminated. This means that Hegel’s system is
dynamic because the only constant is change.
Most importantly, the speculative conclusion simultaneously
preserves both the understanding and its dialectic and their
contradiction even as it negates them. This is because each lower step of
the logic is seen as a building block of each higher stage and, therefore,
must remain even after the higher stage is generated. To use a metaphor
I have suggested before, the lower stages of the logic are like foundations
of the higher stages which are like buildings. 99 A foundation is only a
hole in the ground until it becomes a part of the building built upon it.
Its status as foundation is only retroactively imposed after the building
“negates” its previous status as mere hole. Nevertheless, even after the
building is built, the foundation must be preserved or the entire edifice
“withdraws into its ground.” 100
In other words, Hegel disagrees both with the libertarian who
believes the free market, contract, and property rights should not be
restrained by the State and with the communist who would do away
with private property and the market. Both ethical life and abstract right
(as well as the intermediary realm of morality) are necessary for the
actualization of freedom.
Unfortunately, Hegel writes at such an abstract level that he does
not give us advice as to how to balance the two. Indeed, Hegel thinks
that philosophy is incapable of making such pragmatic decisions which
he leaves to practical reason. 101 This approach is necessary for his project
of explaining the creation of freedom. If logic told us exactly what to do,
we would not be free.
What I want to emphasize here is first, Weiner’s point that the state
is necessary for creation and preservation of positive liberal rights and
freedom, because otherwise we would devolve back into the unfree
Id. at 125–26.
SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 83, at 312.
100 G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL’S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 437 (A.V. Miller trans., 1969).
101 This is one of the points of Hegel’s famous Preface to his Philosophy of Right. Although
Hegel is known as an idealist, he is also a radical materialist in the sense that for an ideal to be
potential, it must be actualized in the world—or more radically, we only know what is potential
retroactively after it is actualized. This actualization, however, can have myriad forms.
98
99

But the infinitely varied circumstances which take shape within this externality as the
essence manifests itself within it, this infinite material and its organization, are not
the subject-matter of philosophy. To deal with them would be to interfere in
things . . . with which philosophy has no concern, and it can save itself the trouble of
giving good advice on the subject.
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 86, at 21.
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regime of the clan. Second, nevertheless, some degree of private
property and markets must be retained. Although there can never be a
perfect balance, there must be a, perhaps uncomfortable, coexistence
between state and freedom. But third and most surprisingly for our
purposes, the Hegelian approach would agree with critics of neoliberalism that market ideology results in commodification and
alienation. However, it also accepts that these are paradoxically
necessary for the actualization of freedom!
IX. THE DIALECTIC OF FREEDOM AND ALIENATION
It is common for progressives to condemn capitalism—what
Europeans tend to call neo-liberalism—for alienating people.
Alienation, however, is a necessary moment in individuation. To Hegel
(and, surprisingly, Adam Smith) that is abstract right’s great
achievement. In earlier stages of development, people are ensconced in
the hierarchal structures of the extended family and clan organized by
status. Although perhaps people living in traditional societies were not
as alienated as contemporary ones because they knew what their roles
were, they were not free in that they had little or no choice in their lives.
This was particularly the case for women who, as Zug’s book shows,
were still largely defined by their status long after American men
increasingly defined themselves through contract.
Hegel’s position with respect to the historical role of contract has
surprising affinities with Adam Smith’s. Smith was writing a generation
earlier than Hegel, when Europe’s clan society (i.e., feudalism on the
Continent, as well as clans in his native Scotland) was in the process of
being supplanted by Enlightenment values, capitalist economics, and
the concept of the liberal representative state.
As Ronald Coase has explained, it is a misconception to think that
Smith believed that people were naturally the rational, self-centered
autonomous homo economicus that we encounter in first-wave law-andeconomics literature. As is the case with Hegel, the individual is the
result, not the cause, of markets. When Smith thought about selfinterest, he conceived of concrete human beings located in family and
society bound by ties of love. That is, self-interest includes caring for
those one cares for. Coase’s point is that although in the simplistic
popular misconception, Smith presents “man [as] an abstraction, an
‘economic man,’ rationally pursuing his self-interest in a single-minded
way[,] . . . . a rational utility maximiser.” 102 In fact, Smith’s man also
feels fellow feeling or sympathy and concern for others. In Smith’s
102 R.H. Coase, Adam Smith’s View of Man, 19 J.L. & ECON. 529, 545 (1976). I make a similar
point about Smith in Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 75.
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words, even “[t]he greatest ruffian, the most selfish violator of the laws
of society, is not altogether without it.” 103 “How selfish soever man may
be supposed . . . [he is interested] in the fortune of others and . . . their
happiness [is] necessary to him though he receives nothing from it,
except the pleasure of seeing it.” 104 In other words, although we do
things for others out of selfishness or self-love, 105 it is not because we
expect to receive some implicit quid pro quo, as the law-and-economics
movement would have it. Rather, making others happy, makes us
happy. 106
Smith’s concern is that such fellow feeling of benevolence has the
limitations that Weiner associates with the clan. This is because the
benevolence one feels for others as an empirical matter varies with
proximity. 107 After self-love, most people feel affection for their
immediate family 108 and a lesser sympathy with their extended family. 109
We often develop relations with friends and colleagues that are almost
as intense as those we have with parents, siblings, and children. 110 We
tend to have fellow feelings towards those with whom we share some
affinity, such as members of what Smith calls one’s order in society or
nation, 111 and I would add religion or ethnic group. As relationships
become more attenuated, feelings for others can change “not simply [to]
the absence of benevolence but malevolence.”112 As Weiner argues, in
clan societies, groups establish solidarity through feuds. 113 Because there
is little conception of individual rights within clans, as opposed to the
collective honor of the clan, disputes among members of rival clans
cannot be peacefully resolved through a legal procedure involving the
two parties. Rather, a perceived wrong suffered by one clan member is
considered a harm suffered collectively by all that must be avenged by
all against the entire clan of the wrongdoer. 114 We see this dynamic in
modern societies not only within gangs, but in lingering racial, ethnic,
and xenophobic hostilities.
103 Coase, supra note 102, at 529 (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS 3 (E.G. West ed., 1969)). Smith continues, “nothing pleases us more than to
observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast.” Id. at 530
(quoting ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 10 (E.G. West ed., 1969)).
104 Id. at 529.
105 Id. at 533.
106 Id. at 530 (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 12–13 (E.G. West
ed., 1969)).
107 Id. (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 192 (E.G. West ed.,
1969)).
108 Id. at 533.
109 Id. at 534.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 WEINER, supra note 69, at 18, 29.
114 Id. at 18, 33–36.
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Consequently, the cooperation needed in a modern state and
economy cannot be achieved through actual feelings of benevolence. To
expect people to feel and act on a “benevolence as encompassing ‘the
general happiness of mankind’ would require man to do something of
which God is no doubt capable, but that is beyond the powers of
man . . . .” 115 Indeed, a government based on benevolence would be
corrupt and undemocratic in that our leaders would naturally favor
those they love over those they do not. 116
Specifically, Smith is contrasting early capitalism to feudalism in
which familial and governmental organization were one and the same.
Not only were the medieval European words for friend and relative the
same, feudal obligations were expressed (and probably experienced) in
terms of love. 117 We should remember that the tropes of romantic love
that Zug criticizes comes initially from the troubadours of courtly love
who borrowed the language of the love of vassal and lord to describe
that of lover and beloved. 118
It is this context that frames Smith’s famous assertion that “it is not
from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.”119
Market relations are valuable precisely because they break down the
“natural” pull of the family and allow cooperation among persons who
are not friends. If the butcher, et al. acted out of actual feelings of
benevolence, he would favor his family, friends, and clan first. Such kinbased relationships can only sustain the simplest economy.
As Coase says,
[l]ooked at in this way, Adam Smith’s argument for the use of the
market for the organisation of economic activity is much stronger
than it is usually thought to be. The market is not simply an
ingenious mechanism, fueled by self-interest, for securing the cooperation of individuals in the production of goods and services. In
most circumstances it is the only way in which this could be
done. . . . A politician, when motivated by benevolence, will tend to
favour his family, his friends, members of his party, inhabitants of his
region or country (and this whether or not he is democratically
elected). Such benevolence will not necessarily redound to the
Coase, supra note 102, at 537–38.
Id. at 541 (quoting ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 818 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937)). As psychologist Paul Bloom states,
“[e]mpathy has some unfortunate features—it is parochial, narrow-minded, and innumerate.
We’re often at our best when we’re smart enough not to rely on it.” Paul Bloom, The Baby in
the Well, NEW YORKER (May 20, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/05/20/thebaby-in-the-well.
117 MARC BLOCH, 1 FEUDAL SOCIETY 231–33 (L. Manyon trans., 1961).
118 Id. at 233.
119 Coase, supra note 102, at 543 (quoting ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE
AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 818 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937)).
115

116
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general good. . . . The great advantage of the market is that it is able
to use the strength of self-interest to offset the weakness and
partiality of benevolence, so that those who are unknown,
unattractive, or unimportant, will have their wants served. 120

Shlomo Avineri sees a similar dynamic in the Philosophy of Right in
the political realm. Note, this aspect of Hegel’s analysis is the mirror
image of my earlier discussion. From the perspective of logic, abstract
right is the most primitive method through which the liberal abstract
person becomes individuated so that she can have the relationships with
others that will make her freedom concrete. As an empirical matter,
however, abstract right occurs late: it is the means by which the situated
clan member separates herself from others in order to become an
individual. In both accounts, however, individualism is the link between
the abstract and concrete; between being autonomous and being
dependent. In Hegel’s terminology, the individual is the sublation
between the universal (Kant’s abstract person) and the particular (status
within a specific clan).
In Avineri’s reading, the family is characterized by “particular
altruism” in which the actor acts “for the benefit of someone else with
whom the actor is connected through ties which are called ‘family
ties’. . . . Hence this altruism is limited and particular and does not apply
to all and sundry.” 121 This is Weiner’s rule of the clan. A state, in
contrast, must be characterized by “universal altruism” in which one
acts “out of solidarity, out of the will to live with other human beings in
a community . . . . based on free consciousness, not on a biological
determination.” 122
To get from the instinctual emotion of particular altruism to the
conscious attitude of universal altruism, we require an intermediate
condition. This is not, as one might suspect, “particular egotism.” This
characterizes the Kantian individual in the state of nature—a logically
simpler conception of personhood that does not exist empirically.
Rather the ideal of political equality requires a moment of “universal
egotism.” 123 This is the regime of abstract right, i.e., civil society and the
market economy. “This is the sphere where everyone acts according to
what he perceives as his enlightened self-interest.” 124
Consequently, the state could not do away with the universal
egotism of civil society or the particular altruism of the family without
destroying itself. The state needs to preserve civil society and its regime
of property, contract, and individual rights precisely because it breaks
120
121
122
123
124

Id. at 544 (emphasis added).
SHLOMO AVINERI, HEGEL’S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE 134 (1972).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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down the “natural” ties of family (i.e., particular altruism) and creates
the type of person who can serve as a citizen. Universal altruism, unlike
particular altruism, is an ethical commitment, not an empirical emotion.
Political equality requires that we not favor those we actually love—
government by love is feudalism. God demands that we love our
neighbor. The state functions because it only demands that we act
towards others as though we love them. 125
Consequently, Hegel, Smith, and Weiner’s point is not just that
individualism and freedom are unnatural. It is that they must be
purchased through a sacrifice of empirical solidarity. Hegelian logic
however, insists that just as abstract right (property and contract) must
be preserved in more developed human societies, so must the order of
right that he calls morality, which includes the affectionate relationship
of marriage.
Zug suggests how mail-order marriage can be a liberating moment
for women, at least during a transitional period from clan-status to
liberal-contract. Although in the clan, relationships are characterized by
actual empirical feelings of solidarity and affection to the extended
family, marriage decisions had to be subordinated to the greater good of
the clan. If this was difficult for men, it was harder for women whose
duty was to reproduce in a way to further the interest of her family. The
empirical emotions that the bride feels for the groom (and vice versa)
were not the primary concern (although presumably, most parents
hoped that their daughters not be miserable).
In this context, mail-order marriage can help to establish
individuality and feminine subjectivity by interfering with marriage as a
status relationship. Is a woman a commodity in a mail-order marriage?
Yes, but she was a commodity in traditional marriage. Hegel argues that
the minimal condition of empirical freedom is subjectivity created
through a regime of possession, enjoyment, and exchange of an object of
desire. Ironically, in mail-order marriage, the woman might become
more subjective by being the active participant in the arrangements of
possessing, exchanging, and enjoying her own body as the object of
desire that heretofore had been controlled by others.
Those who decry the lack of individualized romantic element in
mail-order marital decisions ignore—as Zug insists—that this element
125

As Bloom states:

[Some] have argued, plausibly, that moral progress involves expanding our concern
from the family and the tribe to humanity as a whole. Yet it is impossible to
empathize with seven billion strangers . . . . Our best hope for the future is not to get
people to think of all humanity as family—that’s impossible. It lies, instead, in an
appreciation of the fact that, even if we don’t empathize with distant strangers, their
lives have the same value as the lives of those we love.
Bloom, supra note 116.
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was probably largely missing from the alternatives available for the
women who accepted such offers. In clans, affection is vertical in the
sense that what was important was the empirical love women felt for
their parents and children because their duty is to continue the lineage.
Marital affection might be a happy consequence of—not a reason for—a
successful marriage. Consequently, to complain about the
commodification of women in mail-order marriages is to ignore the
material conditions of these women’s lives. Hegel opines that the
conceptualization of marriage in terms of contract is “disgraceful.”126
And so it is, if the parents and the groom are the effective parties to the
contract. But from the position of the bride, the conceptualization of her
role as a contract party is a step forward. 127
CONCLUSION
Is Zug convincing in her defense of mail-order marriage? Yes, if
one keeps in mind her modest goal. She is not trying to argue that it is,
in its many permutations over the centuries, a wonderful institution.
Rather, she recognizes that historically most women had limited
autonomy. Feminine choice, particularly in connection with the choice
of marriage partners and careers, has been constrained by law and
custom. Nevertheless, women—and more recently gay men—should be
judged as rational actors, not passive victims. In this context, mail-order
marriages can be seen as a way to “increase . . . marital choice and form
advantageous and empowering relationships.” 128 That is, if women have
been dealt with a bad hand, mail-order marriage has been one way they
have played it to their advantage. She concludes, “[t]oday’s mail-order
brides and grooms are not a throwback to an earlier, unenlightened
time. Instead, like most of us, they are simply men and women who
believe marriage will improve their lives, and we should support their
choice.” 129
Zug easily demolishes the critics of mail-order marriages she does
discuss, but leaves me wishing that she gave more time to discussing the
negatives as well as the positives. I am also not entirely convinced that it
is analytically useful to lump together so many different institutions. In
particular, I question whether early colonist and settler recruitment
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 86, at 105.
At least by the high middle ages, the Catholic Church insisted that marriage was a
relationship between the couple so that the bride’s (and groom’s) free consent was a necessary
element. As a practical matter, however, marriages were often contracted by the family and
“consent” was coerced. See, e.g., JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN
MEDIEVAL EUROPE 275–76 (1987).
128 ZUG, supra note 1, at 224.
129 Id.
126
127
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programs really have much in common with contemporary marriagebrokerage websites.
Nevertheless, this is a consistently interesting and thoughtprovoking work. And, dare I say with respect to a scholarly book, it is a
great read.

